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We construct an asset market in a finite horizon overlapping-generations environment. Subjects
are tested for comprehension of their fundamental value exchange environment, and then
reminded during each of 25 periods of its declining new value. We observe price bubbles
forming when new generations enter the market with additional liquidity and bursting as old
generations exit the market and withdrawing cash. The entry and exit of traders in the market
creates an M shaped double bubble price path over the life of the traded asset. This finding is
significant in documenting that bubbles can reoccur within one extended trading horizon and,
consistent with previous cross-subject comparisons, shows how fluctuations in market liquidity
influence price paths. We also find that trading experience leads to price expectations that
incorporate fundamental value.
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1. Introduction
Markets are a critical feature of national economies. Market prices serve as signals, coordinating
the activities of dispersed individuals. (Hayek 1945). Markets are theoretically efficient if prices
reflect all available information as posited in standard economic and finance theory (Muth 1961,
Fama 1970). This property has long been supported empirically in experimental supply and
demand markets for flows of commodity where each unit transacted realizes an immediate
current surplus for each agent identified in the transaction.1
However, there are many instances where asset market prices have become unhinged from the
underlying value of the asset being traded, sometimes for extended periods, often with negative
effects that ripple through the broader economy when the market corrects. The housing market
collapse beginning in 2007 has led to a severe negative equity condition for households, and,
since the banks hold mortgage claims on homes, the banks also suffer from the same condition.
Naturally occurring markets, however, offer limited ability to study price bubbles. In part this is
because an asset’s fundamental value is not normally objectively verifiable and thus, empirical
work that compares prices to some estimated value necessarily represents a joint test of efficient
markets and the accuracy of the estimated “true” value.2 Similarly, it is difficult to determine if
price movements are due to real or fundamental changes in information or not.
As discovered initially in Smith, Suchanek and Williams (1988; hereafter SSW), the laboratory
can provide a replicable environment in which to study market behavior and explore factors that
lead to the formation and collapse of asset price bubbles. In SSW subjects were endowed with
cash and shares receiving dividend realizations from a common information distribution in each
of a known number of periods. As in rational expectations theory the fundamental value of
shares in any period is simply the expected value of the remaining dividend payments. Hence,
fundamental value declines monotonically over time.3

There are hundreds of laboratory

experiments replicating and extending the results of SSW. With inexperienced traders, prices
grow relative to fundamental value creating a bubble followed by a collapse as the endpoint of
1

Such markets converge in minutes. See Smith (1962) and Holt (1995) for a comprehensive survey.
An exception is to be found in closed-end stock funds where large bubbles have sometimes occurred; the Spain and
Iberian funds are examples (See Porter and Smith 2003). See also Xiong and Yu (2010) for a discussion of bubbles
in Chinese warrant markets.
3
See Noussair, et al. (2001) and Noussair and Powell (2001) for discussions of asset market experiments with nonstandard fundamental value paths.
2
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the trading horizon is approached.

That is, a single bubble is commonly observed. With

additional experience bubbles become progressively less pronounced, and approach fundamental
value. As explained below, however, recent studies have greatly illuminated the economic
conditions that account for these bubbles, and established that instructional treatments that focus
on subject comprehension can substitute for experience in moderating or extinguishing these
bubble tendencies.
One shortcoming of the standard asset market experiments is that the lives of the traders and the
assets are identical, and that other market conditions such as the initial amount of liquidity in the
system or the inflow of new liquidity (cash dividends) is fixed. Thus, studies that have examined
the effects of liquidity have largely emphasized using across-subjects market comparisons. This
paper extends the experimental asset market literature by varying market conditions within the
trading horizon while otherwise maintaining the structure common to that literature. Specifically,
this paper presents the results of asset market experiments where traders enter and exit the
market within the longer life of the traded asset. Entry is associated with bubble formation as the
market absorbs the increased liquidity. Exit is associated with bubble collapse as traders remove
money. The cycling of trading generations leads to a pattern of bubble formation, collapse, and
reformation within the continuous trading life of the asset.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section two provides a detailed review of
the asset market literature and section three describes our experimental design. The results are
presented in section four and a final section offers concluding remarks.
2. Background Literature
In the canonical asset market environment, with complete probabilistic information and declining
fundamental value, experience in three separate sessions with the same subjects has been
identified as the one reliable treatment that yields convergence toward the predicted rational
expectations equilibrium. (Sunder, 1995: Porter and Smith, 2003) The conclusions of SSW were
that: (1) the results were entirely consistent with rational expectations as an equilibrium concept;
(2) but complete common information was not alone sufficient to yield equilibrium except
through an experiential learning process in which people come to have common rational
expectations with experience (SSW, pp 1148, 1150). This conclusion has been modified by the
2

work of Lei, et al. (2001). They report experiments in the SSW environment with inexperienced
subjects wherein buyers (endowed with cash) can only buy against dividend value, and sellers
(endowed with shares) can only sell shares. Contract prices persist in varying degrees above
fundamental dividend value in all three of the sessions reported, showing that buyers violate
individual rationality, and that the phenomena of conscious rational speculation—buy low in
expectation of capital gains, then sell high—is not necessary for such mispricing to occur with
inexperienced subjects.4 This contribution implies that experience across three sessions in SSW
accomplishes rather more than creating common expectations: in the process it also eliminates or
corrects initial violations of individual rationality by inexperienced subjects.
Various treatment conditions have been identified that reduce or eliminate mispricing and
bubbles within the same general instructional treatments:
(1) Smith et al, (2000) find that when a single dividend realization is paid on terminal share
holdings, bubbles are essentially eliminated with inexperienced traders. Hence, with trader
attention refocused on end-of-horizon realizations and away from myopic period-by-period
realizations, trader behavior changes dramatically from the bubble behavior reported by SSW
(also see Noussair, et al. 2001 and Noussair and Powell 2010 who further extend the
investigation of the timing of asset return realizations.) Caginalp et al. (1998) had shown that
bubbles were larger if initial cash to asset value ratios are increased, but Kirchler et al. (2011)
perceptively observe that when incoming dividends are realized each period in an environment
of declining asset FV, the ratio of cash to asset value escalates throughout the experiment.
Hence, in comparison with SSW a second important condition in Smith et al, (2000) is being
changed simultaneously: when all dividends are realized at the end of the horizon, rather than at
the end of each period, it removes the flow of incoming cash to fuel momentum trading
sentiment. Smith et al. (2000) also reported a series of experiments in which half of each
dividend realization is paid at the end of each period, and half at the end of the experiment. The
result was more modest bubbles than in SSW, consistent with the effect of the rising cash to asset
value emphasized by Kirchler, et al. (2011). Hence, the strong association of bubbles with incoming
4

Similar wholesale violations of individual rationality were evident in the recent housing-mortgage market bubble.
Thus, in 2005, 45% of first time borrowers paid no money down. (National Association of Realtors, 2006, Exhibit 53). Hence, lenders were exposed asymmetrically to the entire risk of their loan in the event that prices turned down.
If prices continued to rise the entire increase translated into equity for borrowers, who had an incentive to abandon
the home if prices turned down.

3

flows of new cash.5 These informative results may also help to explain why information asset

trading markets in the field tend not to bubble like those in SSW environments. Information
markets are designed to predict a wide array of future events such as company sales (Chen and
Plott 2002), the outcome of political elections (Berg, et al. 2008) and the popularity of movies
(Pennock, et al. 2001). A characteristic feature of these markets is that they create asset claims
on event-contingent outcomes realized at the end of a finite trading horizon.
(2) Noussair and Tucker (2006) add a futures market to the SSW environment on each period
ahead in addition to the current spot market in shares, and this also is quite effective in
squelching bubbles in spot shares. As in (1) this important result may be interpreted as also
requiring traders to focus on value (and actually produce corresponding prices) in future periods;
moreover, it aids backward induction and reduces uncertainty about future behavior of others by
allowing that behavior to be experienced simultaneously in the current period. It demonstrates
what may be the most important role of futures markets: to give individuals advance information
on traders’ own expectations of the future and aid the formation of common expectations.
Several studies have focused on the use of instructions and other pre-experiment exercises
(rather than only experience for given instructions as in SSW) to assess the effect of improved
individual comprehension on group convergence to fundamental value: Kirchler et al. (2011)
emphasize better subject understanding of the declining FV process as a means of greatly
reducing bubbles; Lei and Vesely (2009) give subjects pre-experiment experience with the
dividend process; Huber and Kirchler (2011) show that subjects perform better with training
devices in which the declining FV process is exhibited in graphical rather than tabular form, or
when subjects are administered a questionnaire that reward-motivates them to answer correctly
each period what the FV is for that period. Graphical devices and incentives matter in teaching
the economic principles of rationality that translate into better asset market performance.
All these technical and aberrant conditions that exacerbate bubbles—higher cash to asset ratios,
absence of a futures market, and sources of trader error, irrationality and misunderstanding of
5

This property, however, did not extend to a new series of six long-horizon experiments reported by Lahav (2011)
who studied asset markets over 200 periods using a call market each period. Dividends of 0 or 0.3 “francs” with
equal probability were paid per share each period, adding to the stock of cash. Across the six replications there was
no consistent pattern; in particular, none associated with a single bubble rising with the ratio of cash to shares and
collapsing near the end of the trading horizon. The bubbles observed were erratic in timing, duration and amplitude,
and sometimes crashed and resumed several times, apparently independent of any external change.

4

declining FV—are all corrected by three times experienced subjects in the SSW environment.
However, the easiest and most effective way to foreclose the emergence of a bubble in SSW
environments seems to require no change in the instructions and no experience: eliminate the
period by period inflows of cash (dividends) by paying one dividend realization at the end of the
experiment.

3. Experimental Design
Assets and Trading
In our economic environment shares last 25 periods and have a redemption value of zero at the
end of the 25th period. Following Hussam, et al. (2008), a dividend is paid each period and the
amount is randomly drawn from {0, 8, 28, 60} in cents. A total of 18 shares exist in the market
and every share is paid the same dividend in a given period. In actuality, one dividend stream
was drawn and used in every experimental session.
The fundamental value of a share in period t is  (26 t)cents since the expected dividend
payment is 24 cents each period and dividends are paid at the end of the period. Thus, before the
first dividend is paid, a share of the asset is worth 600 cents. The fundamental value then
decreases by 24 cents with each passing period until the 25th period during which the value is
only 24 cents. This creates the familiar declining stair step pattern for fundamental value used in
the vast majority of asset market experiments.
During each trading period active traders can use cash to buy shares and/or sell shares for cash.
Trading occurs via an electronic double auction market. Active traders can post offers to sell
shares assuming they currently own shares (i.e. short selling is not allowed). Active traders can
also post offers to buy shares assuming they have enough cash (i.e. borrowing is not allowed).
New offers to buy and sell must improve upon existing offers, but displaced offers remain in the
open bid book unless cancelled.6 At any point, an active trader can accept the current best offer
to buy or sell. Completed contracts are displayed graphically in chronological order.

6

The effect of an open book, with all orders standing and visible to the participants, on asset trading behavior has
not to our knowledge been studied in a double auction market. We note that U.S. stock markets do not implement

5

Trader Generations and Predicted Behavior
There were 18 participants in the experiment, each assigned to one of three generations of
traders. A third of the subjects were randomly assigned membership in Generation 1, a third to
Generation 2, and a third to Generation 3. Traders in the same generation were indistinguishable
from one another. Each member of Generation 1 was endowed with three shares and 1500 cents
cash for a total expected portfolio value of 3 . Members of Generations 2 and
3 were endowed with 0 shares and 3300. Cash holdings for Generation 1 were set such that the
ratio of cash to fundamental value was 2.5, as in Hussam et al. (2008).
Generation 1 traders were active, meaning members of that generation could buy and sell shares
and receive dividends, in periods 1 through 10. Generation 2 was active in periods 6 through 20
and Generation 3 was active in periods 16 through 25. With our overlapping generations
framework, the market cycles through five-period sequences of a single generation trading and
five period sequences in which two generations are trading.7 Each time a generation becomes
active, new cash is brought into the market. Each time a generation becomes inactive, cash is
withdrawn from the market.
Generation 3 faces a problem similar to that faced by subjects in standard asset markets as they
are trading assets they can hold until all dividends are paid. However, Generation 2 faces a more
complicated problem in that Generation 2 subjects have to anticipate what Generation 3 will be
willing to pay in period 20 when five dividend payments remain. Generation 1 faces an even
more difficult problem as they have to anticipate how much Generation 2 will be willing to pay
for shares that will in turn be sold to Generation 3.

an open book. What is made public are the following: the most recent trade price, the standing best bid and ask, and
the “stock ahead” (quantity offered) at the standing bid and ask prices. These items are all updated in real time as
they change. We note also that SSW originally followed these information displays and trading rules. Caginalp, et
al. (1998) consider the effect of an open versus closed bid book with a call market institution and find that bubble
amplitudes are dampened with an open book.
7
To maintain the number of shares in the active market, any shares held by a trader after he or she became inactive
were automatically sold to the experimenter at a price of 0 and then resold by the experimenter in the next period at
random intervals by accepting the highest offer to buy. This process was explained to the subjects in the directions.
Traders were also reminded of this in their penultimate active period. On average 1.625 shares were purchased by
the experimenters when a generation exited the market with 46% of these purchases occurring in Session 2 when
Generation 2 stopped trading after period 20.

6

Under standard assumptions, including common knowledge of the rationality of others, traders
should be able to infer that the price in the last period will be 24, the expected value of a single
period. Working backwards the price would equal fundamental value every period. As an
alternative, myopic traders would only value the asset for the dividends they themselves could
receive. Under this assumption prices would decline within each five period increment,
experiencing sizeable jumps or falls when new traders enter or exit respectively, but always
remaining below fundamental value until period 21 at which point price would equal
fundamental value. A third alternative is suggested by Caginalp et al. (1998) and Kirchler et al.
(2011) in which the entry and exit of traders increases and decreases the cash to asset FV ratio,
causing prices to rise relative to fundamental value with entry and the converse occurring as
traders exit. These considerations suggest that we would observe a bubble in periods 6-10
followed by collapse in periods 11-15 followed by another bubble in periods 16-20 and a second
collapse in periods 21-25.
Price Forecasts
While inactive, subjects were asked to forecast the average price in the next trading period. At
the end of the experiment one inactive period was selected for each generation. Subjects
received $10.00 if their price forecast was within 5% of the actual observed price in the selected
period. Answers that were within 10% of the actual price received $5.00 and predictions that
were within 25% of the actual price received $2.50.
Predictions were made during the summary time between periods. While inactive traders could
not observe market trading on their own screens, a market observer screen was projected at the
front of the lab throughout the experiment. The screen listed the bid book, graphed contracts,
provided dividend realizations, showed the average price, and displayed messages about
generations entering and exiting the market as well as the fundamental value. This procedure
also served to provide common information to all subjects and reinforced the commonality of
dividends and the trading process information.
Participants and Procedures
A total of 72 subjects participated in the study, 18 unique people in each of the four replications.
The experiments were conducted at the Behavioral Business Research Laboratory at the
7

University of Arkansas. Participants were all undergraduate students at the institution who had
previously registered in the lab’s subject pool. No subject had previously participated in any
related experiments at the lab. The experiment lasted two and half hours and subjects received a
participation payment of $10 in addition to their salient earnings. Because of the length of the
experiment, all sessions were conducted in the evening. The average total subject payment was
$52.14.
Upon arriving at the lab, subjects were randomly assigned seats, which had privacy partitions.
The directions were presented as a slide show at the front of the room and the text was read
aloud by a researcher. After the directions were finished and any questions had been answered,
subjects completed an online multiple response comprehension quiz. Three of the nine quiz
questions addressed subject understanding of the dividend structure or the declining average
value of dividends remaining to be paid per share; e.g., one question asked “During round 3
trading, the average total future dividend payment for a Share would be;” another, asked “After
the dividend following period 25 is paid, a Share is worth.” After the quiz, subjects learned of
their own generation and the experiment began.
At the end of each round of trading, traders are shown the realized dividend amount and
summary information that includes the average price in the preceding period and (if active) the
subject’s own holdings of shares and cash (inclusive of the dividend payment). During trading,
everyone is informed of the fundamental value of a share based on the expected dividend
realization and the number of dividend realizations remaining. Specifically, the subjects are
shown a statement on the screen such as “This is round 14. The expected total future dividend
payment is 24*12=288.” Consequently, subjects are not expected to hold in memory the
declining FV process, on which their understanding had been tested at the end of the instructions.
Each trading period lasted three minutes and the break between periods was approximately 30
seconds. Trading was electronic via the Zocalo program while price forecasts were hand
written.8 After the final dividend realization, subjects were privately paid their earnings in cash
and dismissed from the experiment.

8

Copies of the directions, the quiz, and the price forecasting handouts are available from the authors upon request.
The Zocalo software is available at zocalo.sourceforge.net.

8

It is worth emphasizing that we are focusing on subjects who experience the market only once.
Thus, our results are comparable to those of inexperienced subjects in asset market experiments.
Based upon the entirety of the asset market literature, as well as data from other experiments
where backwards induction is expected to play a role,9 we speculate that with sufficient
repetition prices would approach fundamental value. However, naturally occurring markets are
not replayed with the same participants and it is this environment that we seek to capture in the
laboratory as it is the domain where bubbles occur and policy is applicable.10 Similarly, and for
the same reason we do not follow the procedures in the background literature above where
instructions and various pre-experiment training exercises are used as a treatment and shown to
substitute for experience in reducing bubble formation.
4. Experimental Results
Figure 1 shows the price pattern relative to fundamental value for each session. The main result
is clear from this figure; three of the four sessions show a clear double bubble pattern consistent
with the bubbles being driven by the influx of cash and the bursts being driven by cash being
pulled out of the system. In every session, shares trade well below fundamental value in the first
five periods. In three of the sessions (all except session 1) share prices are above fundamental
value in period 6 when generation 2 enters the market and continue to bubble in the 7th period.
However, in all three of these sessions, by the 10th period, the last period in which generation 1 is
active, the bubble is bursting and prices are falling. Even in session 1, where prices remained
below fundamental value for the first 16 periods, prices were higher in periods 6 through 9 than
in period 5 and were lower in period 10 than in any preceding period yielding the same
directional price changes as in the other sessions. All four sessions experience a bubble in
periods 16-20. Three of the sessions (all expect session 4) see prices near fundamental value by
period 20 with trading remaining relatively close to this level in the last five periods. The second
bubble in Session 4 inflated and burst more gradually than those of the other sessions, but even
here the prices began to fall as generation 2 was exiting the market and the bubble had burst by
the end of trading.

9

See for example, McCabe (1989) on the unraveling of fiat money with experience.
In motivating his work Lahav (2011, p 22) asks, “However, if the cause of bubbles and crashes is lack of
experience, why are there typically multiple bubbles and crashes in field asset markets? After all, even if
inexperienced traders enter the market, they all have access to the price history of assets.”

10
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Traditionally, asset market experiments have focused on the size and duration of a single bubble.
To examine multiple bubbles, we need to delineate each episode. Therefore, we define a price
trough to occur in period t when pt < pt+x for x {-4, -3, …, 4} where pt denotes the average
price in period t. We define a peak in the analogous way.11 In one instance (Session 4), this
definition does not lead to a unique trough between the first and second peaks. In this case we
take the period with the lower price to be the trough. All four sessions experience a trough in
the first five periods, followed by a peak occurring between periods 7 and 9 (with the peak
remaining below fundamental value in session 1), followed by a trough between periods 10 and
15, followed by another peak between periods 16 and 19 and a final trough in period 20.

Figure 1. Market Behavior by Session
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For periods in which no trading occurred, a linear price trend was assumed to exist between the most recent
average price observed and the next average price observed.
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For each bubble, Table 1 presents three primary characteristics: Amplitude, Duration, Turnover,
and Relative Absolute Deviation (RAD). Let B = {b1, …, bP-1, bP, bP+1, bT} {1, ..., 25} be the
periods over which a bubble occurred with b1 and bT denoting the periods of the starting and
ending troughs respectively and bP denoting the peak period. Amplitude is maximum change in
the difference between price and fundamental value. It is measured as max {(pt - Ft)/
min {(pt - Ft)/

: t  B} –

: t  B} where Ft is the fundamental value of the asset in period t. Duration is

the length of time in periods that prices increase. We provide two measures of Duration. Trough
to Peak Duration is simply the number of periods between the trough and the peak, that is bP-b1.
Standard Duration as typically measured in asset market experiments is measured as max {m: pt Ft < pt+1 - Ft+1< … < pt+m - Ft+m for t (b1, …, bP-1)}. The former definition ignores fundamental
value and does not require a monotonic increase. Turnover measures trading activity in the
market. It is defined as ∑

∈

/ where S is the number of shares in the market and Vt denotes

the trade volume in period t. RAD is measured as ∑

|

|
| |

where

denotes the average

value of F over B. RAD was introduced by Stöckl et al. (2010) as a means to compare bubbles
across markets with different characteristics. As compared to other asset markets evaluated
using RAD in Stöckl et al. (2010), the bubbles we observe are relatively large.
12

Table 1. Summary Characteristics for Each Bubble

Session
1
2
3
4

Bubble

Periods

Peak
Period

Amplitude

Trough to
Peak
Durationa

Standard
Durationa,b

Turnoverc

RAD

1d
2
1
2
1
2
1
2

5-15
15-25
4-11
11-25
1-13
13-25
1-10
10-25

9
18
7
16
9
17
8
19

0.41
0.76
1.79
2.55
3.30
3.26
1.06
1.43

4 (36%)
3(27%)
3(38%)
5(33%)
8(62%)
4(31%)
7(64%)
9(56%)

4 (36%)
3(27%)
3(38%)
2(13%)
8(62%)
4(31%)
8(73%)
5(31%)

4.13(0.38)
4.73(0.43)
6.73(0.84)
3.67(0.23)
13.47(0.96)
7.60(0.58)
15.07(1.37)
13.27(0.83)

0.39
0.27
0.87
1.29
1.22
1.65
0.48
1.94

a. Numbers in parentheses in this column give duration as a percentage of the number of periods between troughs.
b. For the purpose of calculating duration, periods in which no trading occur are treated as though prices followed a
linear trend from the preceding observed price to the subsequent observed price.
c. If the only trading activity involved the intergenerational transfers of shares the turnover would be 1. Numbers in
parentheses in the turnover column give the average turnover per period.
d. Prices in bubble 1 of session 1 remained below fundamental value, but did create a peak and a trough as prices
rose and fell.

We now turn to the relationship between liquidity and bubble behavior. Figure 2 shows the
available cash inclusive of dividend payments in the system each period. By design, the amount
of cash differs across sessions due only to profit taking by generations exiting the market.
Therefore, available cash is the same through the first 5 periods, rises with the entrance of
generation 2, holds constant through period 10 in every session and falls in period 11, after the
first generation exits. It falls most (least) dramatically in session 4(1), indicating that generation
1 traders in that session made relatively more (less) profit than their counterparts in the other
sessions. The increase in cash between periods 15 and 16 was constant across sessions since this
change reflects the cash endowment of generation 3 and the dividend payment after period 15.
The available cash falls again in period 21 when generation 2 exits the market.

13

Figure 2. Available Cash Each Period by Session
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Figure 3 plots the average deviation of price from fundamental value in each block of 5 periods.
This figure reveals a clear “M” shape pattern, consistent with the bubbles forming as liquidity
enters the market and bursting as cash is removed. Two of the four sessions fit the “M” perfectly
and the other two are off on a single segment. If the direction of changes in price deviation were
random, the pattern shown in Figure 3 would only occur with probability less than 0.001.12
Figure 4 plots the average trade turnover per period for each block of 5 periods. Here the pattern
is even more consistent with changes in liquidity driving trader behavior and leading to bubble
formation and collapse. There is only a single segment (the change in turnover when generation
2 exits the market in Session 2) that is inconsistent with an “M” pattern. If changes in turnover
were random, this pattern would occur with probability less than 0.0003.13

12

There are 4 price changes per session (from periods 1-5 to 6-10, from 6-10 to 11-15, etc.) and thus 24 = 16
possible patterns for each session. Therefore, there are 164 possible patterns that could be observed in Figure 3. Of
these, 1 would show an “M” pattern for all four sessions and 4C1 4C1 = (number of choices for session with
mistake)  (ways to have one inconsistent segment out of four changes in a session) = 16 would show only a single
segment inconsistent with an “M” pattern out of four sessions. There are 48 ways that exactly two segments could
be inconsistent with an “M pattern; 24 = 4C1 4C2 in which one session has two mistakes and 24 = 4C2 4C1 in
which two sessions have one mistake each. Therefore, there are only 48+16+1=55 out of 164 ways to observe a
pattern at least as consistent with an “M” shape as what we observe.
13
As in footnote 6, there are 164 possible patterns, 1 of which exactly matches an “M” pattern and 16 that match it
except for a single segment in one of the sessions. Thus, there are only 17 patterns that are at least as consistent with
an “M” shape as what we observe in Figure 4.
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Figure 3. Average Deviation of Price from Fundamental Value per 5 Period Block by Session
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Figure 4. Average Trade Turnover per 5 Period Block by Session
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Finally, we examine the one period forward price forecasts made by inactive traders. The
average predictions each period are shown above in Figure 1 along with the realized average
trading price. Casual inspection of Figure 1 suggests that people rely heavily upon the price in
the previous period when making forecasts. This pattern is also borne out econometrically as
reported in Table in 2. Specifically, we estimate a linear random effects model where the
dependent variable is the individual’s price forecast in a given period and the independent
variables are the average trading price in the previous and contemporaneous periods, the
fundamental value, a dummy variable for periods when two generations are actively trading, a
fixed effect for the individual forecaster and a random effect for each session.
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Table 2. Estimated Price Predictions of Inactive Traders
Generation 2

Generation 3
pre-trading
experience

pre-trading
experience

post-trading
experience

Generation 1
post-trading
experience

2-15

2-5

21-25

11-25

Fundamental Value

-0.162
(0.103)

-0.100
(0.210)

1.404**
(0.265)

0.226*
(0.098)

Lagged Average Price

0.816**
(0.038)

0.959**
(0.199)

1.025**
(0.164)

0.899**
(0.054)

Contemporaneous
Average Price

0.138
(0.040)

-0.001
(0.125)

-0.089
(0.116)

0.229**
(0.054)

Two Generations Active

-12.272
(24.169)

NA

NA

-54.755*
(21.920)

208.295**
(64.910)

86.737
(169.96)

-137.864*
(62.597)

-42.818
(48.888)

306

96

102

306

Forecast Periods

Constant
Observations

* and ** indicate significance at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Standard errors are given
in parentheses. Subject fixed effects are suppressed for brevity.

The econometric results in Table 2 are presented separately for each generation because their
experiences are very different. Generation 3 predicts prices in the first 15 periods of trading
without the benefit of any personal trading experience whereas Generation 1 predicts prices in
the last 15 periods of trading after acquiring market experience. Members of Generation 2 make
predictions both before and after their trading experience and thus we analyze their behavior
separately for each level of experience. The results are revealing. Both Generation 3 and
Generation 2 before gaining trading experience rely heavily upon lagged prices, but not
fundamental value. However, Generation 1 and Generation 2 after gaining trading experience do
rely upon fundamental value in addition to lagged prices. Thus, experience leads subjects to
anticipate that prices will reflect fundamental value. This experience-driven change in price
expectation helps explain why replication so consistently dampens price bubbles; trading
16

experience leads people to expect that others will trade based upon fundamental value.
Interestingly, only Generation 1 is able to anticipate price changes as evidenced by the
significance of the contemporaneous price.
Conclusions
This paper examines the role that liquidity plays in the formation and collapse of asset market
price bubbles. As is standard in the literature, the assets in our experiments pay a known number
of dividends from a known distribution creating a declining fundamental value pattern. Unlike
previous studies, we create a framework of overlapping generations where no one can hold the
asset over its entire life, but the older generation can sell their shares to the younger generation.
Subject comprehension of their task and of the declining fundamental dividend value structure is
tested by a quiz at the end of the instructions. Moreover, subjects are reminded of the declining
fundamental value by informing them what this value is during each round.
The liquidity in our experiments varies as traders enter and exit the market, resulting in a
repeating pattern of bubbles and busts. As new traders bring money into the market a bubble
forms and as exiting traders take money out of the market the bubble collapses.14 Our double
bubbles are, to the best of our knowledge, the first instance in which multiple bubbles associated
with the entry and exit of generations have systematically been observed in the laboratory over
the life of a single asset. Our results also provide strong evidence of the role liquidity plays in
bubble formation.
When participants in our study were not actively trading, they forecast average price in the next
period. While each group of forecasters relied upon the observed price in the previous period,
those who had already gained trading experience also relied upon fundamental value, but those
who lacked trading experience did not. That trading experience leads subjects to focus on
fundamental value helps explain why bubbles consistently disappear with experience or are less
likely to form with some pre-experiment training exercises.

14

The boom may be driven in part by the desire of members of the new generation to balance their portfolios and
the busts may be driven in part by the older generation needing to liquidate its holdings and the resulting decrease in
opportunities to hold shares for speculative reasons.

17

References
Berg, Joyce, Robert Forsythe, Forrest Nelson, and Thomas Rietz, 2008, Results from a dozen
years of elections futures markets research, Handbook of Experimental Economics Results,
ed: Charles A. Plott and Vernon L. Smith, Elsevier: Amsterdam, pp. 742-751.
Caginalp, G., D. Porter and V. Smith, 1998, Initial Cash/Stock Ratio and Stock Prices: An
Experimental Study, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, January, 95 (2) pp.
756-761.
Chen, Kay-Yut, and Charlie A. Plott, 2002, Information aggregation mechanisms, concept,
design and field implementation, Social Science Working Paper no. 1131, California
Institute of Technology.
Fama, Eugene, 1970. Efficient capital markets: A review of theory and empirical work, Journal
of Finance 45: 383-417.
Hayek, Friedrich A., 1945, The use of knowledge in society, American Economic Review, 35, pp.
519-30.
Holt, C., 1995, “Industrial Organization.” In J. Kagel and A. Roth, eds., The Handbook of
Experimental Economic. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Huber, J. and M. Kirchler, 2011, The impact of instructions and procedure on reducing confusion
and bubbles in experimental asset markets. Forthcoming in Experimental Economics.
Hussam, Reshmaan, David Porter and Vernon Smith, 2008, Thar She Blows: Can Bubbles Be
Rekindled with Experienced Subjects? American Economic Review, 98, pp. 924–37.
Kirchler, Michael Jürgen Huber, Thomas Stüockl, 2011, Thar she bursts – Reducing confusion
reduces bubbles. Forthcoming in American Economic Review.
Lahav, Yaron, 2011. Price patterns in experimental asset markets with long horizons. Journal of
Behavioral Finance, 12(1), 20-28
Lei, V. and F. Vesely, 2009 , Market Efficiency: Evidence From a No-Bubble Asset Market
Experiment, Pacific Economic Review, 14, pp. 246-58.
Lei, V., C. Noussair, and C. Plott, 2001, Nonspeculative Bubbles in Experimental Asset Markets:
Lack of Common Knowledge of Rationality vs. Actual Irrationality. Econometrica, 69, pp.
831–59.
McCabe, Kevin, 1989, Fiat Money as a Store of Value in an Experimental Market, Journal of
Economic Behavior and Organization, 12, pp. 215-31
Muth, J.F., 1961, Rational expectations and the theory of price movements, Econometrica, 29,
pp. 315-35.
Noussair, C. and O. Powell, 2010, Peaks and valleys: Price discovery in experimental asset
markets with non-monotonic fundamentals. Journal of Economic Studies, 37 (2), pp.152 –
80.
Noussair, C, and S. Tucker, 2006, Futures Markets and Bubble Formation in Experimental Asset
Markets, Pacific Economic Review, 11, pp 167-84.
Noussair, Charles, Stephane Robin and Bernard Ruffieux, 2001, Price Bubbles in Laboratory
Asset Markets with Constant Fundamental Values, Experimental Economics, 4, pp. 87-105.

18

Pennock, David M., Steve Lawrence, C. Lee Giles, and Finn Arup Nielsen, 2001, The power of
play: Efficiency and forecast accuracy in web market games, Science, 291, pp. 987-8.
Porter, D. and V. Smith, 2003, “Stock Market Bubbles in the Laboratory.” Journal of Behavioral
Finance, 4, pp 7-20.
Smith, V., 1962, An Experiential Study of Competitive Market Behavior, Journal of Political
Economy, 70(2), pp. 111-37.
Smith, V. L., G. Suchanek, and A. Williams, 1988, Bubbles, Crashes and Endogenous
Expectations in Experimental Spot Asset Markets, Econometrica, 56, pp. 1119-51.
Smith, V. L., M. Van Boening and C, Wellford, 2000, Dividend Timing and Behavior in
Laboratory Asset Markets, Economic Theory, 16 (3), pp. 567-83.
Stöckl, Thomas , Jürgen Huber and Michael Kirchler, 2010. Bubble measures in experimental
asset markets. Experimental Economics, 13, pp. 284-98.
Sunder, S. 1995, Experimental Asset Markets: A Survey in The Handbook of Experimental
Economics (J. H. Kagel and A. E. Roth, eds.). Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Xiong, Weil and Jialin Yu, 2010. The Chinese Warrants Bubble. American Economic Review
101, pp. 2723-2753

19

